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THE WAR OF EACH AGAINST 
ALL IN THE MARXIST STATE 
Virginia Black 
In our days the State has come to be a formidable machine... 
set up in the midst of society... a machine whose existence and 
maintenance depend on the vital supports around it., sucking 
out the very marrow of society. 
José Ortega y Gasset 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of mankind toward a more humane exis-
tence can be witnessed through three historic stages. Each 
represents a precious legacy of hard-won value. This three-fold 
perspective on the civilizing advances of mankind was suggested 
to me in an article by Gerhart Niemeyer entitled «Modern 
Politics» in which he evalutates the great advantages of the 
limited state and of liberty 1. Niemeyer enunciates the three sta-
ges that led to, and describe, these benefits. First, the separa-
tion of church and state imparts full liberty to the conscience 
of the person by prohibiting institutional religion or self-righ-
teous superego from intimidating those who differ. Coercive 
politics are lifted out of the life of religion and spirit. Second, 
the separation of society and state gives causal force to the 
1. From Niemeyer's column «Days and Works», National Review, March 
18, 1977. 
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associations that persons spontaneously form. Purely social 
associations supplant the need for political power. They help 
persons adapt their natural social inclinations to their purposes. 
They diminish the need for legal enforcement. The plural 
society resulting from free association enriches the personal life 
and the life of the community. The separation of society and 
state allows us to separate law and government. Law is 
society's property, not the property of politics. Accordingly, it 
allows us to keep government under law. The «rule of law» 
constitutes the heart of social accord. 
Third, the separation of individual and society distinguishes 
the intrinsic moral dignity, sanctity and conscience of the per-
son from the groups, communities or civil orders to which he 
belongs. We call this individualism. Individualism enables us 
morally to criticize existing practices, customs, and norms wit-
hout denying their influence and support. This separation of self 
from society in recognition of the individual as an autonomous 
and worthy center of chosen purposes brings about a host of 
valuable relationships, natural goods, and beneficial contribu-
tions to society as a whole. Scientific, legal, artistic and entre-
preneurial improvements develop, and prosperity is produced. 
These benefits characterizing the public interest cannot develop 
if persons' unique contributions are not recognized. This suppo-
ses differentiation from collective wholes and their sometimes 
suppressive norms. Foremost among social goods is the intrinsic 
good called liberty of the person. Self-fulfilment in the enjoy-
ment of liberty needs no utilitarian justification. Liberty and its 
yield are rights in and of themselves. That society benefits from 
liberty of the individual is a wondrous bounty. 
Constituting this heightened morality of individualism are 
rights of individuals against the immoral potentials of political 
force. Rights are a common-good product only of individualism 
because only as justice to the individual becomes a reality, 
does justice to everyone become a reality. John Mill put it this 
way: «Justice implies something which it is not only right to do 
and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can 
claim from us as his moral right». There is no moral right to 
justice if individualism is not first conceptualized, then fostered. 
These three historical adaptations are unquestionable better-
ments in our moral, social and spiritual life. They were not 
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arranged, designed, decided upon or produced by states. They 
were not political, legislative or administrative policies. 
Slowly they evolved, moral insights transcending their times, 
adapting themselves in practicable, institutional form. Today 
the range of their circumference and legitimacy is comprehen-
sive. No one wishes to roll back history to church, social or 
state empowerments over persons. 
I should like to examine a problem that arises with the 
third of these moral elevations of humanity, the separation of 
the individual from society. It is a problem which invades the 
other two civilizing advances because they are all connected. 
There is a false doctrine about this third moral advance, indi-
vidualism, a doctrine that has become popular and dangerous. 
I believe this false doctrine may have led Karl Marx toward a 
repudiation of individualism and, of course, the capitalist 
society he thought presupposed and promoted it. We are fami-
liar with the result of the Marxist rebellion and the ideology 
that Marx replaced individualism with. In our times, this 
thought-mask has caused almost a century and a half of eco-
nomic pathologies, social distortions and belligérant civil 
upheaval. 
My thesis is this: The Marxist revolt against the dehu-
manization of man which Marxism attributes to capitalist eco-
nomics takes on the same malignant assumptions that it 
repudiates: First it holds that individualism means that man, 
under capitalism, is anti-social, selfish, exploitive. Then by 
requiring the force of the absolute state to put down self-
aggrandizing individualism and inaugurate true community, the 
Marxist ideology reinforces and perpetuates this, false view of 
man until it becomes inherent in the Marxist ideology of the 
state and cannot be shaken off Statist Marxism sees human 
nature and social reality almost exactly like Thomas Hobbes: 
anti-social, brutal, exploitive, selfish. Marxism adopts the 
Hobbist premises of individualism, then finds it cannot get rid 
of them. I should like to show how, through a misinterpreta-
tion of the separation of individual from society, this parado-
xic twist takes place whereby that which is detested invades 
its détester. 
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n. MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF THE SEPARATION 
OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 
The Marxist rebellion took two forms. One was ineffectual 
and relatively harmless. The other rebellion is still threatening. 
1. Ideal Marxism tried to weld the individual back to 
society by moving toward the Utopian community, the ideal of 
the brotherhood of man as a worldwide, stateless condition. I 
shall say no more about ideal Marxism except to note what is 
known: Not even modestly conceived Utopian communities sur-
vive for long on Marxist communitarian principles. First to dis-
solve are those founded on secularism, horizontal authority or 
egalitarianism, and common property wherein meum and teum 
are cut down as guiding norms. Marxist Utopias fade away in 
formless anarchisms of impossibility 2. 
2. Statist Marxism is the realistic threat. It houses the pro-
blem of individualism I want to examine. It too tried to weld 
the individual back to society. Then it took a step in keeping 
with the economic and political reality it thought it perceived, 
but a step that was contrary to its futuristic ideals. Marxist 
Realpolitik discovered that if the goal of community-shared 
property, production and distribution is to be sustained, the 
state cannot wither away at all. The vision of the future 
remains society without the state. But until Utopia arrives, the 
state must be inextricably laminated onto society. This is 
because the need for a controlling and enforcing power to 
manage property resources and their allocation, and eventually 
everything related to them, is so compelling and comprehensive 
that society cannot be left autonomous. It has virtually to trans-
form itself into the all-controlling state. This program naturally 
also requires putting down the type of virulent individualism 
that Marxism defines. 
Under statist Marxism, state and society therefore become 
one undifferentiated entity. They become fused in meaning. 
2. If sovereign states are to wither away, it may be for the opposing reason: 
Property integrity under law will so unify and cohere the structure of society, 
that the state will be seen to be superfluous. Numerous historical examples 
demostrate the existence of firm lines of legal control without the state. 
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Society is perceived as state and state is perceived as collective 
whole. What begins as an effort to socialize man by taking out 
his core of selfish individualism, ends in politicizing society. 
After the ideological surgery, no conceptual room is left for 
personal and interpersonal activities. The withering away of the 
state on behalf of humanization is so completely abandoned in 
realistic or statist Marxism that state and society are not con-
ceptually distinct anymore; the point where the state terminates 
its control over society and the individuals who constitute it, is 
blurred beyond identification. Is this account an exaggeration? 
(The people) cannot .represent themselves, they must be 
represented. Their representative must at the same time 
appear as their master, as an authority over them, an un-
limited governmental power which protects them from the 
other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. 
The political influence of the small-holding peasants, there-
fore, finds its final expression in the executive power which 
subordinates society to itself. 
Thus does Marx write in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon. It is not a matter of diminishing society's indepen-
dence from the state. It is a matter of being unable even to 
conceptualize society's independence from the state. The execu-
tive power expresses what society is, «subordinating society to 
itself»! The nightmare foreseen by Frederic Bastiat has happe-
ned: Society cannot imagine its own existence without imagi-
ning a controlling central power 3 . 
Statist Marxism thus regresses to the continuum in history 
wherein society and state cannot even be thought of as separate 
entities. The medium in this thought-distortion is the idea of 
anti-social individualism. If society can no longer be thought of 
in itself because it requires permanent coercion to enact and 
maintain humanitarian ends by ridding itself of selfish indivi-
dualism, then the moral idea of the person who is in certain 
ways separable from society, also necessarily withers away, and 
with it. the individual's rights. Nor can the benign advances in 
human morality and the common good that we identified as 
products of the liberty of the person be realized. Reflecting this 
3. F R E D E R I C B A S T I A T , The Law, F E E , Irvington, New York, 1970. 
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enfeeblement in the causal force of freedom of the individual is 
the well known Marxist notion of the «superstructure» wherein 
morality and even positive law are thrust into supine inutility. 
Marxist construction of the ideology wherein independent 
personhood cannot be thought of because it is subordinate to a 
monolithic, inescapable process, and hence persons have no 
property even within themselves, necessitates rationalizations by 
which political engulfment of the freely chosen associational life 
of man appears justified. We are familiar with these turgid dis-
tortions. Civil life is narrowed into a means-end relation whose 
past, present and future are forced by a monocausal agency of 
change alleged to be the ultimacy of history, a set of economic 
determinations over which persons and groups have little 
influence. There is no way to prove, or to disprove, the ulti-
macy of history or the causal ineffectuality of human morals 
and law. Hence a faction, the Party, can appropriate to itself 
the office of representative of history in its inevitable progres-
sion toward the self-realization of the laboring class heretofore 
oppressed. 
Stripped of meaning and causal power, the morality and 
self-sustaining reciprocities of social life secured under legal 
rights no longer protect the person or define his associational 
life. They can no longer, therefore, promote a humane and civi-
lized existence. They are inert. Moreover, they are needless. If 
social life is unreal and non-existing, it no longer requires pro-
tection from harmful interference. 
To justify this absorption of social life by the state, rationa-
lizations enter into statist Marxism and remain permanently 
fixed there. 1) The individual is selfish and antagonistic to his 
fellows. His evil instrument is property. If property is a tool of 
aggression, then no one must own property. Since the individual 
is selfish and aggressive, the state has to deny him property. 2) 
Social life takes on this taint of human nature: left autonomous, 
it is exclusive, exploitive and factional. Therefore the state as 
«executive power which subordinates society to itself» is justi-
fied in destroying norms and institutions that represent unjust 
property positions. When these institutions and practices can no 
longer be identified as tools of class discrimination, classes will 
be helpless to exploit, exclude and divide. 
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Is this account an exaggeration? Marxism calls for «the for-
cible overthrow of all existing social conditions*. Just as the 
conceptual synthesis of an Hegelian pyramid absorbs the identi-
ties of thesis and antithesis, so does the pyramid of the sove-
reign state absorb the identities of persons and groups. Is it not 
illogical to assign rights and protections to entities like persons 
and groups that cannot be thougt to exist? 
A false and deceptive interpretation of individualism had 
earlier appeared in the philosophic and political literature. Indi-
vidualism was understood by Thomas Hobbes, and by seminal 
thinkers influenced by him, as harboring a self-centered, self-
aggrandizing bias in the nature of man. Rightly, individualism 
meant liberty, non-interference by others, including the state, in 
persons' innocent choices. But with Hobbes, and later with 
Marx, individualism meant that persons, in choosing, choose for 
themselves alone. Distortion in the concept of individualism lay 
in attributing to the agent of choice (to persons) some of their 
purposes: purposes in their own self-interest; then it lay in 
interpreting «seif-interest» to mean «selfish», «other-denying». 
or «other-obstructing». But psychological egoism is a false 
doctrine. 
Hobbes thought selfish individualism characterized human 
nature. The laws of nature if enforced by political sovereignty 
correct this adversarial condition. Marx thought selfish indivi-
dualism characterized human nature under capitalism. The 
currents of history if catalyzed and enforced by Party correct 
this adversarial condition. Prudence harnassed to self-interest 
underlies Hobbist statism. Idealism harnassed to economic 
equality underlies Marxist statism. But absolute state sove-
reignty knows no difference between these motives when their 
means come to the same thing. Both Hobbism and Marxism 
render a might-makes-right explanation of justice. The forces of 
human fear and the forces of class history are the final justifi-
cation for the sword of the state. 
Six significant ideas will help to illustrate how this false 
version of individualism invaded Western culture and invited 
the Marxist critique of the dehumanization of man which, when 
its implementation becomes clear, turns Marxism upside-down. 
These six familiar criteria defining Hobbist individualism typi-
294 VIRGINIA BLACK 
cally approximate Marxist doctrine and its assumptions. What 
do these six criteria mean on the Hobbist-Marxist interpretation 
of individualism and the political life? 
1 ) Individualism means that persons are competitive and 
self-aggrandizing. They desire to control others out of fear that 
others will control them. In short, they despise and use their 
fellows when they have the right to do so. Since beating each 
other out is what constitutes «society», then absolute state 
intervention in this war of each against all represents a higher 
moral condition of history. 
2 ) In its relation to individualism, property presupposes that 
persons are privatistic, self-seeking, greedy for more. They 
crave the power that accrues from increasing their property, 
from having wealth and enjoying consumption. They turn this 
property-power against others who have less. Domination and 
injustices arise. These excite civil strife. But the collective 
community as Party is conscious of what is going on. It has the 
right to reform the maldistribution of property, thereby ridding 
society of the unrest caused by legal discrimination. In this 
moral task, the state thus represents a higher condition of his-
tory. , 
3) Factions and classes are the result of persons grouping 
together out of expedience and for their exclusive purposes: to 
dominate or to fend off the domination of others. Factions 
advance self-interest that cannot be advanced by individuals 
alone. No other motive than self-centeredness explains group 
association. Persons being also competitive and property-
hungry, these factional interests contend with each other. Eco-
nomic struggle and warfare is the outcome, «naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation» of the laboring classes by the 
owners of property or capital, the ruling elite. Such inequities 
and strife need not occur if the sovereign as the state Party for-
bids the formation of factions. In representing the collective as 
a whole and repressing factional war, the state thus constitutes 
a higher moral condition of history. 
4) The unvirtuous character of man is seen in his inhuma-
nity. In Hobbes, this is individual antagonism and greed; in 
Marx, it is class antagonism and greed. Individualism disincli-
nes persons to carrying out natural acts of benevolence, charity 
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and mutual aid. Not social or affiliative, man's fear and greed 
contradict the impulse to share or sacrifice; selfishness works 
against community association. With virtue in scarce supply, 
man's purely social institutions are discriminatory and exclu-
sive. Designed to forward sectional interests, they are ineffec-
tual distributors of welfare, service agencies, keepers of the 
peace. Since it is the paternal state that brings «sunshine from 
above» and not virtue and affection that supply to each accor-
ding to his needs, enforcement from the center with its perva-
sive regulative arm represents a morally advanced stage of 
history. 
5) Survival of the fittest is a dangerous and immoral con-
dition. Hobbism takes' this condition as a natural evil to be 
quelled, in the interest of peace, by political absolutism. Mar-
xism takes this condition as capitalist domination to be stamped 
out, in the interest of justice, by political absolutism. Under the 
private property nexus of ownership, only the fittest, the owners 
of capital, survive and do well. The powerful, energetic and 
resourceful, or those who have inherited wealth, rule the state. 
Their superiorities in economic fortune become fixed to legal 
privileges that allow them to treat the poor and the weak 
unjustly. But if the state in representing the collective whole 
owns the capital and distributes its product, then no dominant 
elite exists and hence those who are fit cannot discriminate 
against wage labor. 
6) Alienation and anomie describe man, who is fun-
damentally alone. Competitive, he is estranged from fellowship, 
he is in separation from others and hungry for a compensating 
power. His factional forces work for him but only in working 
against others. He joins with others to safeguard his survival or 
well being, but this brings him no real fraternity. Only the state 
as indivisible sovereign replacing society, fosters peace, equa-
lity, fraternity that satisfy the ideal of unalienated humanity. 
These six measures of the Hobbist-Marxist view of man and 
society illustrate misunderstood individualism. All reflect acute 
ambiguities in the idea of the separation of the person from 
society. Each of these measures, with allowance for their em-
phases, describes both Hobbism and Marxism. Each demonstra-
tes how fundamentally alike they are in their perception of 
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mankind, of society as a war of each against all and its politi-
cal remedy: the complete sovereignty of the state conceived as 
a moral agent transcendent over human beings in natural 
society. • ; 
I I I . WHAT IT MEANS TO SAY INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 
ARE SEPARATE 
Careful observation and historical study unbiased by ideo-
logy discover falseness in the Hobbist-Marxist view of the indi-
vidual. Individualism connects not with anti-social alienation or 
vengeful self-seeking but with rights justified by a conception of 
the moral worth of each person. The person is a natural unit of 
sentience and suffering; he is the smallest independent unit of 
consciousness and moral reasoning we can distinguish. This is 
why unleashed, ulterior force used against persons completes 
the reason for fixing rights to individuals. Individualism there-
fore has nothing to do with an alleged malevolent nature of 
man or of brutal superiority within a capitalist order. These 
notions are indifferent to each other. Indeed we shall see that 
socialized, affiliating human nature is presupposed by the indi-
vidualism of the free society. In my concluding remarks I 
analyze what this means and show how the limited state both 
requires and fosters the social nature of man. But let us see 
first what it means to say that individuals are separate from 
society. 
Even if persons are innately social, person and society are 
independent ideas distinguishable in concept and context for 
certain purposes. Rights are these purposes. Rights assume the 
crucial importance of thinking of persons separately from any 
particular societal arrangement. Persons have a nonprohibitable 
claim to be untrammeled by norms which their conscience can-
not accept. They have a claim to be free from obligations or 
roles their spirit cannot endorse; they have a right to exercise 
autonomy of will in their choices of association or separation. 
They have a right to engage in voluntary trade, barter, contract 
or an exchange with other parties. They have a right to criticize 
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their social and political and legal environment and its practices 
and institutions. 
These opportunity-making and self-realizing claims —sub-
ject always to equality in these rights, to obligations not to 
invade them, and to the non-injurious nature of their exercise— 
presuppose that the individual on the one hand is autonomous 
with respect to any given social interaction, community or 
norm. Yet on the other hand, he may be fully immersed in 
communal influences and in many-leveled social orders. Indeed, 
because persons are socialized in just these ways, they retain 
rights against the state's intrusion upon these vital associational 
and self-realizing domains. 
Clearly what are needed in this dangerous debate are refine-
ments in the individual-society distinction. These refinements 
include clarification of the varied contexts and concepts in 
which self-society independence serves the purpose of moral 
explanation. These contexts and concepts allow us to understand 
how it is possible for rights to function for individuals so as to 
make their social nature possible of enhancement in so many 
and various ways. 
Let us therefore correct and refine the malignant and mis-
chievous interpretation of individualism that has crept into our 
literature and law, holding back and denigrating social develop-
ment. I should like to show what each of the six criteria we 
examined actually means when individualism is placed in the 
context of human development. When these meanings are clear, 
a paradoxic twist will emerge. Marxism's alleged evils of capi-
talism drawn from the Hobbist characterization of man will be 
seen even more pointedly to characterize the very heart of Mar-
xism itself. Statist Marxism demands that the Hobbist features 
of human nature be retained. If they are not retained, statist 
Marxism loses its reason for being. Statist Marxism retains 
invidious individualism because the concept is needed in order 
to rationalize the continued existence of absolute sovereignty. 
1) The meaning of competition is narrowly stipulated within 
economic theory. Therein it has nothing to do with —nor does 
it cause— morally repugnant motives; nor does it reinforce anta-
gonism in human nature. Indeed competition describes a propi-
tious social condition brought into existence by liberty in 
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economic relations. Competition is a consequence of prohibiting 
legal or administrative barriers against any party's entry into 
the practice of voluntary exchange. Competition means that 
buying, selling, contracting are open equally to everyone wit-
hout political discrimination, adversive or favored. Economists 
know that competition, or freedom of entry, drives purchasing 
power higher. This is the meaning of wealth, or prosperity, a 
common good consequence of economic rights. Without this 
social good, few persons can be satisfied according to their 
need. 
It is true that «competitive» can also describe a personality 
and not only a beneficial social condition. But as a personal 
attribute, competitiveness must turn up in a wide variety of 
situations, and for this reason it can have no reference to a 
capitalist order. Too, whenever we notice a competitive perso-
nality, this suggests that relative to what we expect of human 
nature, competitiveness is exceptional. 
But politics is the most «zero-sum game» that exists. There 
cannot be a winner without a loser. This means invidious com-
petition. Pervasive, lingering competitiveness characterizes the 
ambiance of political campaign and office. Unlike the variety, 
surpluses and substitutes produced by liberties of economic 
exchange, political positions are a scarce, and an unreplaceable 
commodity. Since political position must be gained or won by 
popular appeal or favoritism and not on merit, scarcity in this 
desired commodity tends to arouse a competitive urge. The fact 
that power is wielded in office arouses a competitive threat, for 
the power of one party is positioned to dispense with the power 
of another. Competitiveness reflects the anxious and threatening 
necessity to continue in office, to increase one's powers and 
benefits, to gain control over a segment of society. Competition 
reigns where two or more want the same thing and substitutes 
do not exist, as, for example, the scarcity of important offices 
in the ruling Party faction of a Marxist state. The unequal 
advantages delivered to the holder of political, or -coercive, 
power demonstrate that it is the statist mentality that is 
competitive, nasty, brutish and short. 
2) Property means proprietary, proper or right. Property in 
one's person or goods is thus whatever is rightful to protect. A 
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ight is an individual's property, and likewise one's own person 
s his property. The idea of property as that which cannot be 
ilienated thus helps to secure that we view persons and what 
ire theirs as of inherent moral value. 
In implying an individual right, property furnishes a founda-
ional idea on which to build moral and legal justice. In the 8th 
century BCE, the peasant-poet Hesiod brought to court an 
ippeal against his brother's illegal appropriation of Hesiod's 
ightful inheritance of land. The ancient case illustrates the 
ogical relationship, already in place between «justice» meaning 
xwhat is rightfully one's own» (or «what is one's due») and 
jroperty. This universal, common moral and legal idea of jus-
ice is indifferent to particular economic systems like capital-
sm or to personal motives like acquisitive greed. On the 
contrary, it was the acquisitive greed of Hesiod's brother that 
»vas corrected by the idea of rightful property belonging to 
Hesiod. 
Rules of obligation are immanent in the affectional life of 
man, and they are associated with various claims we have upon 
Dne another. These moral and legal obligations are properties of 
social life because, everyone —society— is obligated to respect 
an individuals right. 
«Private property» has nothing to do with a greedy human 
nature or with a certain type of social economy. Private pro-
perty is a basic human right because it secures persons in the 
power to do the harmless things they choose to do. Private pro-
perty is, for example, one of the most decisive powers persons 
can use in realizing their charitable and communitarian desires 
without drawing away from the parallel powers of others to do 
the same. (This is only, of course, when property is generated 
by free exchange.) These powers in using productive property 
lessen alienation, fears, destitution; and hence it is morally 
urgent that the powers which property bestows be kept circula-
ting so that more rather than fewer persons can make use of it, 
tailoring it to accommodate effectively the circumstances 
which persons create and confront. By withholding from the 
state a monopoly on its use, free economic functioning more 
than anything else fans out private property over a wide social 
domain. 
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Before modern capitalism, the largest owners of property 
were political rulers and their favorites and pawns. This still is 
true whenever government controls people through controlling 
the property that is the product of their energies. Their energies 
belong to their persons, the source of all wealth. Because rulers 
and sovereigns well understand the manipulating potential that 
comes from the possession of property when they are accorded 
the authority and enforcement prerogatives to use it, they com-
pete for the power to coerce property from others —to tax, to 
inflate the currency, to subsidize their constituency's wants, to 
make transfer payments, to distribute income, to confiscate— 
using property and the power to control it to enhance their self 
interest while seeming to enhance the public interest. What is 
new about this? Very little. Plato identified the despot in The 
Republic. «They always do take a share...as much as their 
leaders can give them, as they take it from the prosperous and 
distribute it to the people, though they keep the greater share 
of it to themselves.* Self-interested power as the definition of 
justice is as old as the Sophists. 
If justice rightly implies to each his due, then power to 
direct one's own life that rights of property guarantee belongs 
to the members of society and not to the factional monopoly 
called the state. 
3) Pernicious factions and classes, like a disease hard to 
eradicate from the bonemarrow of society, demonstrate that 
collusion and discrimination have been locked into law and 
administrative fiat. Factions feed on having their demands met. 
This can only be done by taking the blinders off justice and its 
indifference to persons and interests. As the excitant of fac-
tions, the state can hardly be thought of as their dissolvant and 
arbitor. A faction is a collective with an identifiable self-
interest that can only be satisfied at the expense of others. Its 
goal is therefore to determine, and sometimes to seize, the 
direction in which governmental resources, forces and favors 
shall be used. If the state has previously discriminated in viola-
tion of general principles of just law, those who are disadvan-
taged by this abuse of right will naturally desire to form 
counter-factions to redress the perceived injustice; hence it is 
inevitable that factions multiply under the discriminatory state. 
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In the Marxist state as we know it today, factions, except for 
the ruling elite, the Party, are suppressed. Only by keeping 
«faction» distinct from «social group» can we make sense of 
the fact that social groups are the innocent production of natu-
ral society, factions the product of the state. Under Marxism 
the distinction dissolves: Construing society as nests of 
mutually exploitive factions (economic classes), Marxism, we 
saw, calls for the forcible overthrow of all existing social con-
ditions. It subordinates society to the state. 
Contrariwise, fluid patterns in economic functioning when 
left unmanipulated by the state, free the economic positions of 
its participants. If fair and equal general law prohibits tampe-
ring with economic liberty, economic blocs, factions, classes 
cannot be maintained. Victims of the dehumanization of clas-
ses cannot, therefore, exist. As between owners of capital and 
laborers for wage, class-struggle cannot, therefore, occur. 
Unfortunately, to take the United States as an example, wage 
labor supported by discriminatory law has become the most sel-
fish sectional interest in opposition to the common good 4. 
4) What is the moral character of mankind? Do we know? 
The question is problematic. It is not clear that this is fully an 
empirical question or what supplies an acceptable answer. 
«Human nature» is usefully defined in contexts for certain pur-
poses; all that seems necessary is their mutual consistency. 
What is not in dispute is man's social appetite. Recently 
there has appeared an important study on the biological basis 
of altruism 5. Even homo economicus seeking gain (not necessa-
rily for himself) by the most efficient and resourceful means, 
presumes an environment in which promise-keeping, integrity, 
reliance and trust among people are sustaining motives. Obliga-
tion and responsibility are the moral heart of all aspects of 
freedom. The idea of the separation of society and person never 
included denial of this social constant; it never implied that 
4. E U G E N V O N B O H M - B A W E R K . The Exploitation Theory. Libertarian Press. 
South Holland, IL. (U.S.A.). B6hm-Bawerk's brilliant analysis of labor-
management, or employee-employer, relations explains how it is that labor 
exploits capital, turning the Marxian explanation on its head. 
5. I have in mind E . O . W I L S O N ' S Sociobiology, A New Synthesis, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (U.S.A), 1 9 7 5 . 
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man's rational calculation of benefit and the most economical 
means to obtain it obstructs his inclination to care about others, 
to join cbmmunity, to render aid. 
Man's virtue is reflected in his obligation to respect a right. 
It is therefore reflected in the separation of the idea of a person 
from the idea of society; persons may not be subordinated to a 
tribal whole. They may not be seen only and in all aspects as 
satisfiers of societal roles, as fillers of office or as members of 
families, clubs, localities, economies or nations. It is legitimate 
and morally essential not to confine their identity and moral 
dignity to cultural parameters, regional influences or accepted 
norms of relating. Persons reach out to the stranger. They can 
be morally original, iconoclastic, prophetic of transcendent 
insights. Man's moral nature must at times be existential but 
his spiritual obligations may be thought of as a-social, bonded 
as they are to asceticism, privatism, renunciation. He must 
often lose society in order to find his spirit, a deliberate, resto-
rative act of temporarily «putting aside». 
The moral integrity that individualism presupposes did not 
begin with John Locke and the limited state. In Western culture 
it began with the religion of the Hebrews 3500 years ago, and 
later with the philosophy, politics and history of the ancient 
Greeks. On the other side and evidencing the need for moral 
and positive law are relationships so grievous and tormenting 
that everyone finds them intolerable. Theft, personal assault, 
murder, treachery are such relationships. These are, be it 
remembered, crimes of the state that is not bound down by the 
chains of the law. 
5) The Marxist rebellion took survival of the fittest to 
mean an unjust condition fostered by the economic inequalities 
of capitalism. Capitalists are the fittest, who survive. The weak 
and the unfit (the laboring, exploited poor) go under. 
On the contrary, «survival of the fittest» becomes a princi-
ple of justice. The term has nothing to do with a postulated 
ruling class with dominating economic power. Rather, it expres-
ses and approves a second fundamental concept of justice 
equally ancient and significant as Hesiod's «to each his own» 
and intimately related to it. This concept of justice denotes that 
it is the agent or author of an action that, all else being equal, 
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is to enjoy, or suffer, the consequences of his action. Here is 
the original statement of individual accountability, in its native 
context: «Each individual shall reap the benefits brought to him 
by his own powers, inherited and acquired» 6. Penalties are to 
be inflicted, or rewards bestowed, only in consistency with 
merit or deservingness (justice as desert). Only the doer of an 
act takes the blame if it is wrong (unfitting) and deserves the 
reward or gain if it is right (fitting). Justice as desert or merit 
is the core idea of moral and legal responsibility. 
This principle of adaptation, requiring causes to stay toget-
her with their natural effects, as in nature, results in a societal 
working out of things; society as a whole —the general 
interest— benefits from the extinction of those plans, designs 
and operations, both individual and organizational, that do not 
work effectively, that are «unfit». Maladaptive (wrong) actions 
get weeded out; adaptive actions (cost-efficient, well-working, 
accepted, norm-conforming, socially utilitarian, etc.) survive. 
The moral and legal principle of meritarian justice, as this 
idea of natural differences and mutual adjustment has come to 
be called, closely follows factr Persons and other parties do 
tend to experience the consequences of their actions, and these 
actions will be unequal as among them. Meritarian justice thus 
seems to mirror a natural ethical law more than any other ulti-
mate principle of conduct if it is not pressed to the letter. Let-
ting merit rise to its own level matches our intuitive sense of 
what is right to occur in the interest of individual justice. Once 
again, the general welfare is the beneficiary of liberty of 
merit. 
Justice as desert —getting what is one's due— is one of the 
giant steps of civilization. Unless the person in some sense is 
individuated and his social units are correspondingly liberated 
from accountability in determining his actions, justice is not 
possible. It is not «society's fault» that an individual acts cri-
minally and that his crime is socially unfit. This deeply indivi-
duated idea of justice as merit or desert —Marx called it a 
6. H E R B E R T S P E N C E R , «The Data of Ethics», in Luis Navia and Eugene 
Kelly, Ethics and the Search for Values, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New 
York, 1980. 
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«defect in unequal labors»— enables us to escape from the ini-
quity and tyranny of collective responsibility whereby a group 
or community is blamed, punished or made to suffer for the 
actions of one or few. Such tribal retribution describes the war 
of each against all. The idea of individual accountability also is 
not new. It is ancient. Socrates' defense of the ten generals 
after the battle of Arginusae illustrates the moral essential that 
the conduct of each of us must be understood on its merits and 
that our enterprising efforts should be allowed to own whatever 
rewards others may see fit to render them. 
This natural law of deservingness which means that en-
terprise, effort, discipline and talent shall not be robbed of their 
yield, is silent on the treatment of those who have little they 
can offer. It is not implied that the less capable shall be neglec-
ted, that they ought not survive or cannot enjoy the advantages 
of culture and legal justice. Nothing whatsoever is implied, by 
society's respect for meritarian justice, regarding the treatment 
or condition of persons who cannot cope with the risks of life, 
participate in the development of their capacities, or contribute 
very much to the lives of others. On the contrary: The resour-
cefulness and responsibility of those who thrive have generated 
such economic and cultural wealth, when they enjoyed the right 
to do so, that the «unfit» have risen, today, to their highest 
level in history. When the «fittest» survive, they can help the 
less fit. In this propitious truth lies another example of benefits 
in the social interest arising out of rights and powers fixed to 
the individual and instrumented through his choices. That an 
individual's powers belong to himself does not mean that he 
uses them only for himself or to do others in. This, we saw, is a 
sustaining error in the Hobbist-Marxist interpretation of indivi-
dualism. The victims of realist Marxism as it violates the nume-
rous faces of meritarian differentiation suffer poverty, collective 
injustice and oppression. 
6) Alienation and anomie describe a mood disorder which 
individuals suffer differentially. There is no evidence that isola-
tion from one's fellows correlates positively with the exube-
rance and independent spirit generated in a capitalist society. It 
is hard to see how freedom from oppression, from torture, from 
constraints on civil and economic liberty thrusts persons into 
the lonely anguish of alienation and despair, fragments their 
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emotions or dries up their affiliative concern. On the contrary: 
we saw that social concern is presupposed by the principles of 
individual rights and of the state governed by law. If these prin-
ciples define and help to sustain a peaceable and productive 
order, then networks of positive and facilitating interactions 
must remain firmly in place. Law cannot govern the ungoverna-
ble temper. 
But we have made a significant discovery. As a widespread 
social pathology, alienation is inversely related to participative 
decision-making, to community self-rule and belongingness. 
Since the neighborhood, the family, the community, the school, 
the club are contact points for heightened sociability and perso-
nal caring, it has been the centralizing of political, social and 
economic power that promotes anomie. A state that holds itself 
sovereign over religion, education, art, travel, association, and 
recreation, as well as employment and production, must lead 
persons not to care about anything at all. A program that calls 
for «the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions» 
must lead persons to be alienated from the society that has 
been captured by the state. When thé state is rotten and dege-
nerates, Plato warned us, the individual degenerates as well. 
(When) the mass of the poor people come to believe that the 
wealthy classes in society are oppressing them... the poor put 
forward one man to champion their cause. When their leader 
comes to power, he begins to oppress the rich... So does des-
potism represent the final and absolute decline of the... 
state 7. 
The dissolution in our times of effective governing represen-
tation, of free congregation and the closeness and sense of ful-
filment this engenders, is, I believe, directly attributable to a 
trend toward the centering forces of the nation-state and the 
concomitant destruction of the decentralizing idea. The most 
threatening and painful alienation as a general social malig-
nancy results from depersonalized abstraction in the modern 
Marxist state. 
The six criteria we examined have gone round in a vicious 
circle. Marxism assumes that individualism means what Hobbes 
7. P L A T O , The Republic. Paraphrase by Brian R. Nelson, Western Political 
Thought, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey (U.S.A.), 1982. 
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took it to mean. Marxism denounces individualism. The state is 
the agent of this denunciation. Since rights belong to indivi-
duals, they are stamped out. With them goes the right to asso-
ciate freely and the elimination of the state-independent idea of 
society. The result is deterioration in the social, communitarian 
life of man. This is alienation. Alienation is the product of the 
Marxist state in destroying the internally willed solidarity of 
natural groups and spontaneous relations. 
IV. CONCLUSION: INDIVIDUALISM PRESUPPOSES 
THE SOCIALIZED PERSON 
The sociality of human nature is multivocal. This means 
that it is universal, everywhere present and in countless forms. 
But it is not without limits. We do not have to imagine an ideal 
society in which property is res nullius in order to discover fra-
ternity and brotherly love. Individual rights make sense only 
because individuals are born, nurtured, educated and conti-
nually dwell among others in a social setting. Without this 
social setting, no individual would profit from owning a right 
since a right is a claim against violation of man's many-leveled 
sociality. Socialization completes the differentiating biological 
and chemical processes of individual development. As we are 
socialized, so are we differentiated: so do we become distinct 
individuals. 
Parenting, learning, educating are social experiences. All 
require modeling upon other persons. 
We are social because no one is self-sufficient. No one 
wants to be self-sufficient. Our most dreaded punishment is iso-
lation. In facing death, we yearn for the comforting presence of 
other persons. 
Voluntarily, individuals enter into I-thou relationships, into 
informal groups and organizations whose benefits of association 
are too numerous and obvious to overlook. Persons enjoy affi-
liative and affectional emotions for their own sake. They love, 
and they grieve when loved ones die. They work together by 
choice, plan and goal-seek together, play together, and «misery 
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loves company*. They enjoy common and shared purposes; 
they cooperate and compromise. The customs, norms and anti-
cipations that direct human reciprocities are totally products of 
personal interaction. 
Thousands of associations have been founded, when secu-
red in the right to do so, for the purpose of rendering aid, ser-
vice, scholarship, praise to strangers. Powerful and effective 
voluntary actions of individuals and groups give the lie to a 
definition of man as a rational calculator of his own benefit; 
they confute an account of man awakened into exploitation and 
class struggle by capital. 
The most prosperous nation in history has been the most 
altruistic nation in history. It has been, for most of its life, a 
capitalist nation. 
Language is a social commodity: it is comprised of con-
ventions of interaction and public agreement evolved over time 
through peoples in union. Truth, knowledge, morals, science, 
law, language formulates, communicates and corrects these 
social institutions. If the social order were not natural and self-
maintaining, law could not help to regulate relationships, moral 
rules would be inapplicable, and the exchange of goods and ser-
vices could not generate the patterned expectations that make 
planning and improvements possible. This exchange is, in fact, 
a paradigm of the separation of self from society because it 
requires contracting individual parties in trusting interactions 
and because it presumes personal valuation. Yet the wondrous 
product of this separation of self from others is the most com-
plexly welded and coherent social system we have discovered. 
The social order that free trade produces is a foundation for 
civil peace, and its prosperity is a foundation for the 
general good. 
In all these varied and innumerable forms of social 
influence and interaction, there is no such thing as individuals 
in opposition, alienated, competitive, exploitive, selfish, «the 
antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes*. Marxism's 
misunderstanding of individualism necessitates a misunderstan-
ding of society as well. No political center is immanent in 
society's nature or is essential to its unity and cohesion. 
Society is networks of chosen association, of consent and con-
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sensus, and of influence on many levels all at once, concentric 
circles of overlapping sociality, guarded and protected by law. 
Marxist ideology contradicts an understanding of this inherent 
sociality in human nature. It cannot even postulate the social 
constants we examined, since there can be no constants what-
soever in an historicist picture of human nature. We have 
already seen how Marxism destroys society itself. 
In the shocking rhetoric of exploiting and exploited classes 
lies the deathblow to the development of mankind toward a 
more humane existence. Marxism describes the war of each 
against all that mirrors only itself, putting an end to the civili-
zing advances of man. 
